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The Hermeneutics of Recovery: Facilitating Dialogue Between African and Western Mental 
Health Frameworks1 
 
Camillia Kong, Megan Campbell, Lily Kpobi, Leslie Swartz, Caesar Atuire 
 
Abstract: The widespread use of faith-based and traditional healing for mental disorders within African 
contexts is well known.  However, normative responses tend to fall within two camps: on one hand, 
those oriented towards Western psychiatry stress the abuses and superstition of such healing, whilst, 
critics adopting a more ‘local’ perspective have fundamentally challenged the universalist claims of 
Western diagnostic categories and psychiatric treatments.  What seemingly emerges is a dichotomy 
between those who endorse more ‘universalist’ or ‘relativist’ approaches as an analytical lens to the 
challenges of the diverse healing strands within African contexts.  In this paper we draw upon the 
resources of philosophy and existing empirical work to challenge the notion that constructive dialogue 
cannot be had between seemingly incommensurable healing practices in global mental health.  First, 
we suggest the need for much needed conceptual clarity to explore the hermeneutics of meaning, 
practice, and understanding, in order to forge constructive normative pathways of dialogue between 
seemingly incommensurable values and conceptual schemas around mental disorder and healing.  
Second, we contextualise the complex motives to emphasise difference amongst health practitioners 
within a competitive healing economy.   Finally, we appeal to the notion of recovery as discovery as a 
fruitful conceptual framework which incorporates dialogue, comparative evaluation, and cross-cultural 




 The immense challenge of reconciling different explanatory models of mental health disorder 
and treatment in African settings is well documented (Patel, 1995; Sohrsdahl et al, 2010).  Though 
indigenous knowledge systems around health are increasingly recognised as important, with calls to 
foster greater collaboration between practitioners of parallel streams of health care, worries persist that 
indigenous or local forms of mental health care, particularly faith-based healing, can result in human 
rights violations and abuse.  This gulf between practitioners of Western biomedicine and African faith-
based healing is highlighted in two quotations: 
 
It’s very difficult to differentiate between psychiatric conditions and when. . . you are hearing the 
voice from God. When the person really has a psychiatric condition—a known psychiatric 
condition—and says he’s hearing [a] voice from God, and he’s seeing things in dreams while he’s 
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fasting. . .we [the biomedical staff] believe that he’s maybe hallucinating. Maybe he’s undergoing 
the signs and symptoms of [a] psychiatric condition. . . [The faith healers] will believe anything 
that the patient says, any form of hallucination. In talking to this person, they will believe it, that 
actually there is [a] spirit talking to them.  
—Community psychiatric nurse  
 
First is the spiritual, before the physical. . . The [psychiatric] medicine won’t work [and] the 
physical issue won’t resolve itself until the spiritual is addressed first. . . The healing actually 
comes spiritually before it manifests itself physically.  
—Prayer camp pastor (Arias et al, 2016) 
 
At first glance the divide between these two views appears to illustrate the incommensurable 
mental health perspectives running parallel within Africa, specifically around the epistemic standing of 
hallucinations, mental disorder causation, and the status of the spiritual and the physical worlds.  These 
divergent accounts of mental disorder seem to provide a window into fundamentally irreconcilable 
worldviews.     
 There are two possible normative responses to this putative incommensurability: one might be 
to dismiss outright the claims of non-biomedical practices, like faith-based healing, working towards 
the phasing out of these ‘primitive’ practices and beliefs to be replaced with a ‘universal’ standard of 
care, diagnostic categorisation, and/or normative frameworks (such as human rights).  A second 
response, in contrast, is to adopt a relativist position, suggesting that claims of biomedical psychiatry 
and faith-based healing might be equally valid depending on the local context, but neither has priority 
over the other given the absence of any universal criteria.  These responses represent an area of 
longstanding debate in global mental health between proponents of universalist and cultural relativist 
approaches. 
However, this paper argues for a third, relatively unexplored but much needed framework that 
seeks strategies of dialogue, reciprocity, and mutual enrichment, which fundamentally challenge the 
false dichotomy that tends to characterise debates around global mental health.  Three aspects of this 
response are crucial: first is the need for conceptual clarity and normative resources to develop an 
intellectual framework that fosters interpretive openness, dialogue, and conceptual enrichment.  Second 
is to contextualise the motivation to emphasise incommensurable difference, whereby practices and the 
performance of identity within the economy of healing can help elucidate why practitioners of both 
Western biomedicine and African faith-based healing can emphasise, and potentially exaggerate, their 
respective distinctiveness.  Third is an appeal to a practical concept that can function as a potential 
locus of productive cross-cultural dialogue.  This approach applies a combined practical and 
philosophical analysis to highlight constructive points of contact between African and Western 
practices of mental health.  Philosophical resources have been largely ignored in discussions of global 
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mental health, yet these will be useful in identifying areas of conceptual confusion as well as potential 
normative frameworks which can ground cross-cultural dialogue and engagement.  
We first outline the objectives of a global mental health approach (GMH) and how these have 
been subject to critiques by more cultural relativist approaches to mental health, particularly around the 
aspiration to ‘scale up’ Western psychiatry in the global context.1  These critiques, however, tend to 
perpetuate a false dichotomy between universalist and relativist positions, resting on a conceptual 
elision between incommensurability and incomparability.  The paper then suggests ways in which the 
normative resources of hermeneutics will be an important mechanism to help foster interpretive 
engagement, constructive dialogue, and conceptual enrichment between Western psychiatry and faith-
based healing in global mental health.  We also explore how the performance of identity and power 
dynamics in a competitive healing economy can lead to the emphasis on, or even exaggeration of 
difference between practitioners of Western psychiatry and African faith-based healing.  Finally, the 
concept of recovery as discovery is discussed as a potential area of productive convergence: this concept 
draws upon key claims of the recovery movement, but is further enriched through an examination of 
how spiritual dimensions of healing might be understood and differentiated.  We suggest these as vital 
strategies which might encourage greater reciprocity and collaboration between the practices and 
conceptual frameworks of African modes of faith-based healing and Western psychiatry.  
 
Global Mental Health Approach 
 
The ethical argument for global health equality and social justice grounds a GMH approach 
(Kirmayer & Pedersen, 2014) which also draws from a human rights perspective to promote human 
dignity and fairness across countries, cultures and contexts (Kleinman, 2009).  The imperative to redress 
social inequalities (Venkatauraam, 2010) is based on evidence of the high prevalence, disabling impact 
and economic burden of neuropsychiatric disorders, and the treatment gap of vast disparity in mental 
healthcare services and resources between high and low-middle income countries, including vulnerable 
populations such as the poor, immigrants and refugees (Kirmayer & Pedersen, 2014).  The GMH 
approach seeks to develop, implement and evaluate evidence-based mental healthcare practices in low- 
and middle-income countries (LMICs), scaled up through task-shifting from the relatively few 
psychiatrists and psychologists to mental healthcare workers, in order to improve access to services and 
interventions and thereby reduce the treatment gap (Patel, 2014; Lund et al 2012).  Moreover, GMH 
aims to implement policies which lead to greater parity between physical and mental health care 
investment.   
However the GMH approach has come under criticism from more localised, socio-cultural 
perspectives which highlight how Western psychiatry is in itself a cultural product that cannot be 
assumed a priori with universal application (Kirmayer & Swartz, 2013).  With an emphasis on social 
determinants of mental health, local priorities and strengthening community resources, socio-cultural 
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approaches argue that GMH may perpetuate Western psychiatric categories, concepts and interventions 
that may not be locally relevant (Kirmayer & Pedersen, 2014).  The imposition of global categories 
could divert attention from local social determinants of health and the potential value of indigenous 
healing strategies that potentially contribute towards recovery (Kirmayer and Swartz, 2013).   Some 
critics of GHM suggest even further that its normative and practical agenda symbolises the continuation 
of Western colonialism through its disregard for indigenous culture and implicit promotion of the 
economic interests of multinational pharmaceutical companies (Mills, 2014; Summerfield, 2014).  By 
contrast, advocates of GMH directly challenge such depictions, ‘put[ting] to rest any notion that mental 
disorders [are] a figment of a “Western” imagination and that the imposition of such concepts on 
‘traditional’ and ‘holistic’ models of understanding amoun[t] to little more than an exercise in neo-
colonialism’ (Patel & Prince, 2010).   
This long-standing debate between what may be termed universalist approaches within GMH 
and their more culturally relativist critics has led to caricatures which exaggerate their conceptual 
divergence, despite actual practice to the contrary.  Both sides of the debate rest on a false dichotomy 
between universal and relativist positions: either one must adhere to a general framework of mental 
disorder causation (drawn from Western psychiatric diagnostic classifications and health determinants), 
or one is committed to a cultural relativist position, where all local, indigenous approaches stand equal 
to that of Western psychiatry.  This dichotomisation ultimately reflects deeper questions around which 
normative lens can best promote greater health equity between high-income countries and LMICs, with 
GMH often drawing upon a framework of universal human rights and relativist approaches appealing 
to critical, post-colonial approaches based on decolonisation and the uptake of local practices.   
 On one hand, proponents of transcultural psychiatry rightfully caution that unreflective 
applications of Western psychiatry in the global context often mean a failure to engage meaningfully 
with the conceptual schemas and normative practices of different cultures (Whitley, 2015).  Some argue 
that within African thought and practice, for example, mental disorder cannot be reduced to physical 
causes, but is situated within a holistic framework with metaphysical commitments, where existents in 
the spiritual domain (i.e. spirits, ancestors, etc.) are believed to exercise agency within the physical 
world, impacting on the health and well-being of individuals (Omonzejele, 2008; Kahissay et al, 2017; 
Kyei et al, 2014).  Moreover, the maintenance of healthy social relationships is conceived of as an 
intrinsic part of health and healing.  These social and metaphysical commitments sit uneasily with the 
reductivist, secularist orientation of Western frameworks around the biogenetic causation of mental 
disorder.  Consequently, attempts to ‘upscale’ Western psychiatric practices tend to represent some 
form of intellectual, cultural imposition, particularly from an African worldview. 
 On the other hand, cultural differences can often be exaggerated for two reasons: first, the 
existence of plurality is often conceptually mistaken for relativism, where the descriptive fact of cultural 
divergence, of incommensurable values, conceptual schemas, and ways of life, is presumed to entail a 
relativistic acceptance of all values, beliefs, and practices.  Yet incommensurability can be understood 
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in two different senses (Chang, 1997): first is a claim about the difficulties of finding a common 
measurement of value, whereby different values or goods cannot be quantified according to a single 
metric.  For example, one may experience a conflict between equally valuable goods, such as religious 
devotion – which might mean adhering to one’s pacifist commitments – and love of country – which 
might mean going to war.  Both goods are not reducible to the same scale, where we attach numerical 
values to one good and compare it with the numerical values of the other.  These goods are therefore 
incommensurable in a strict sense, as in immeasurable according to a single unit of value.   
The second sense of incommensurability refers to the more dubious claim that there is no 
criterion that could be used to compare, evaluate, and decide between plural values, conceptual 
schemas, or ways of life.  Put differently, the diversity of values, human goods, and conceptual schemas 
means these are incomparable.  This claim has implications for the boundaries of culture and the 
(im)possibility of finding common ground between different outlooks towards life.  Indeed, Bemme 
and d’Souza (2014) point out that the act of asserting a neat distinction between global and local 
approaches is in itself an act of construction, and may not reflect what happens in practice.  Local 
adaptations and applications of GMH often require considerable adjustment given local conditions, but 
these adaptations may not be fully attended to because of the manner in which these adaptations are 
written up for a GMH audience.  Similarly, those with a close interest in the ‘local’ can defocus from 
aspects of local practice which easily translate into global terms. 
 We will have more to say about how different values and conceptual schemas might be 
compared and evaluated in the next section.  The key point here, however, is that the universalist and 
cultural relativist debate in GMH has revolved mainly around the overly simplistic notion of 
incommensurability in the second sense, whereby incommensurability has become confused with 
incomparability (Spiro, 1986; Kozuki & Kennedy, 2004).  Yet acknowledging the absence of a common 
measurement need not lead to the culturally relativist conclusion that divergent values, conceptual 
schemas, and practices cannot be compared or evaluated.  Nor in challenging such relativism does this 
lead to a crude universalism that promotes certain frameworks without question, e.g. human rights or 
Western psychiatry.   
Second, as we discuss in further below, the exaggeration of differences can reflect complex 
motives amongst health care practitioners within the African health care context.  Claims of 
incommensurability, particularly around modes of healing, are closely related to the development and 
performance of distinctive healing identities within a pluralistic, competitive health marketplace.  
 
Incommensurability and the Hermeneutics of Dialogue 
 
So far we have suggested that the prevalent normative logic in global mental health debates 
continues to frame divergent conceptual schemas around health and healing as a choice between 
universal ethnocentrism or relativism.  If we deny the prospect of ‘universal’, cross-cultural standards 
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of some kind – or at the very least are alive to the problems associated with unquestioned commitment 
to such standards – it seems that we are then logically committed to an incommensurable modus vivendi.  
This means that all ways of life are equal to one another, given the absence of any Archimedean 
standpoint or objective rationality by which different values and practices can be evaluated.  The 
prospect of relativism suggests that each culture and their practices cannot be assessed with any external 
standards or characterised as somehow ‘inferior’ or ‘primitive’.  A normative commitment to relativism 
seems not only to be inevitable, but ethically necessary if due respect is to be shown to African faith-
based healers and those who use their services. 
But this way of presenting the issue is misleading for two reasons.  First, it conflates two 
separable claims: the fact that there are highly problematic comparisons does not entail the additional 
claim that no evaluative comparison is possible.  This is particularly evident in the context of mental 
health.  Different cultures may reference the same phenomena differently: for one context, the 
phenomena might be called ‘depression’, in another it might be referred to as ‘thinking too much’.  We 
might rightly consider whether the phenomena of ‘depression’ is exactly equivalent to ‘thinking too 
much’ – just as we might rightly question the comparative leap involved when a psychiatrist 
recommends anti-depressants in a context where it is considered ‘thinking too much’ (i.e. ‘this 
phenomena is exactly the same and demands the treatment that is recommended in Western 
psychiatry’).  We have to be mindful of constitutive cultural and linguistic meanings implied even at 
the descriptive level.  But none of these claims preclude evaluative comparison writ large: the fact that 
divergent conceptual schemas and practices can revolve around a common phenomenon or a common 
concern – even as the linguistic equivalencies are absent – presupposes something in common.  By 
implication, the potential for some evaluative comparison is left open.  Returning to our example, 
whether diagnosed as ‘depression’ or ‘thinking too much’, in both cases the common element is that 
this condition is seen as ‘unhealthy’.2  The differences lie in the interpretive construct which in turn 
conditions the importance that is attributed to the condition and the therapy that is recommended.  The 
presence of a common element constitutes the foundation for an evaluative comparison and a search 
for converging, richer interpretations of the phenomenon.  
Second, claims of incomparability essentialise the conceptual schemas and practices within 
culture, characterising these as isolated and self-perpetuating rather than dynamic, interactive, and 
evolving.  When paired with the concerns around GMH, this generates a rather contradictory picture.  
Post-colonial critiques of GMH emphasise the need to respect indigenous perspectives and practices 
and recognise the harm of the ethnocentrism implied in GMH initiatives.  Indeed, appreciating local 
culture remains, at root, a core animating principle of transcultural psychiatry.  However, such respect 
is poorly served through a relativist framework: what may emerge could be a protectionist picture of 
static, insular local mental health practices which, ironically, would be equally at home within colonial 
perspectives of the ‘primitive’.   
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The presumption of incomparability underlying cultural relativism also has deeper costs.  The 
possibility of comparison and evaluation is necessary to appreciate and recognise cultural difference in 
a meaningful way – it requires pathways to engaging in dialogue and critical assessment about the 
respective merits and shortcomings of different cultures – including one’s own.  However, a relativist 
framework produces self-validating ‘enclaves of mutual incomprehension’ (Healy, 2013, p. 268).  This 
is pernicious in a descriptive sense, insofar as it contradicts the historical reality and experience of 
translation, enculturation, and cultural exchange within Africa, situated within a globalised world.  Even 
as these experiences are intertwined with abuses of colonial power and status, they are also closely 
bound to the negotiation, navigation, and reappropriation of power relations, agency, and social norms 
in fostering African identity.   
Equally, it is pernicious in a normative sense, insofar as it treats these enclaves of mutual 
incomprehension as a valuable state of affairs, removing any positive obligation to engage in some form 
of meaningful dialogue to understand the conceptual schemas and practices of others.  At the heart of 
relativism is a core tension between community and tolerance.  Typically the ethical warrant of 
relativism is grounded in its potential to cultivate tolerance for another’s set of beliefs and conduct.  But 
as Ajei points out, tolerance is in itself an unstable concept: it presupposes a negative normative 
judgement which denotes difference that is rooted in undesirability, disagreement, disapproval, and a 
sense of one’s own superior or better judgement (Ajei, 2017).  Toleration suggests that ‘we remain 
respectful of each other in our silos of conviction and conduct and endure our differences’ but ‘the 
negative cast at the onset of our encounter, and conduct to substantiate this judgment, has the effect of 
obstructing the creation of community’ (Ajei, 2017).  Erecting barriers which separate us from different 
others therefore becomes a justifiable form of addressing and living with diversity.  By contrast, mutual 
respect of different cultures necessarily challenges claims of incomprehensibility premised on the 
exoticisation of certain practices and beliefs; recognising the truth and value of different conceptual 
schemas stems from aspirations towards building community through identifying potential common 
points of concern and being open to possibilities of enriched awareness and learning through cross-
cultural contact.   
Given these descriptive and normative problems, why do debates in global mental health still 
often retreat into this dichotomy between ethnocentric universalism and cultural relativism?  We can 
point to valid concerns on both sides, and both share a desire to improve the health and respect of 
individuals with mental disorder.  What is often overlooked, and is perhaps even more critical, is how 
both also share the same two competing commitments at a deeper level.  On one hand, there is the 
widespread realisation that some form of cultural modesty around mental health is necessary – if not 
owing to the imperative to respect cultural difference and local practices, then for basic pragmatic 
reasons (such as optimising the uptake of certain treatments).  But such modesty seems to demand a 
retreat to relativism premised on the incomparability of cultures and conceptual schemas.  On the other 
hand, our methodological commitments in the human and social sciences hold fast to norms of objective 
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validity, where the ideal of universal repeatability is presumed to guide our descriptions and analysis of 
human behaviour and experience – including that of mental disorder.  Either our commitment to cultural 
modesty or our model of scientific knowledge has to give way as a result: what we might sacrifice in 
cultural openness we gain in terms of the putative epistemological soundness of our methodology, or 
vice versa.  Regardless, whether from a relativist who rejects it or an ethnocentric standpoint that 
embraces it, the shared presumption is that ways of acquiring knowledge of human behaviour and 
experience demand methodological adherence to an ideal of objective validity.  They might lead to 
different conclusions, but ultimately, the epistemological orientation of both share the same misguided 
starting point, with the same dogmatism and reductionism in approach. 
Unpicking the putative validity of this starting point will be critical to overcoming the false 
dichotomy in global mental health debates and facilitating the genuine cross-cultural engagement 
needed to establish fruitful points of contact between African and Western approaches to mental health.  
Here, the framework of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is central in two ways, each of which 
we discuss in turn (Gadamer 2004).  First, Gadamerian hermeneutics poses the critical question as to 
whether this model of science – with its epistemological orientation and the methodological trappings 
that follow – is even appropriate when we are dealing with complex human experience and meanings.  
Instead, there is the validation of intersubjective forms of knowledge, constituted by complex 
expressive meanings and divergent but evolving conceptual schemas.  Second, this framework provides 
a dialogical model that helps foster an interpretive understanding of different ways of life, where alterity 
or ‘otherness’ is considered a necessary foil for conceptual enrichment and ethical growth.  
Gadamer in Truth and Method presents a critical challenge to the predominant model of 
scientific knowledge within the domain of human affairs.  This model presumes that valid knowledge 
of human behaviours and phenomena comes about through the deployment of a particular methodology, 
committed to epistemic norms of neutrality which effectively remove the knower from her historical, 
cultural, and social context.  Only through a stance of impartiality are we then capable of grasping an 
object in a unilateral, fixed sense.  What this implies is that the interpretive and linguistic domains lack 
any epistemological standing in understanding the human sciences: they are relegated to ‘subjective’ or 
‘unreliable’ descriptions of behaviour or meaning that cannot stand for objective truth.   
Crucially, Gadamerian hermeneutics fundamentally questions this epistemological stance, 
suggesting that the interpretive domain of understanding is in fact the only grounding we have to come 
to grips with the complexity of human meaning and affairs.  In other words, when scientific 
methodology is upheld as the standard by which we understand human meaning, we have effectively 
adopted the incorrect model of science to understand ourselves and others; rather than achieve an 
elusive (and impossible) goal of ‘objective truth’, we occlude the intellectual orientation that is 
necessary to enrich understanding.  Truth in the domain of the human sciences never achieves the 
finality or control over the object or phenomena in a way that mimics the natural sciences, but is ever 
evolving and open-ended by virtue of the intersubjective, interpretive, and linguistic dimension that is 
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constitutive of human meaning and behaviour.  Rather than perceiving the scientific self as a disengaged 
subject before an object, Gadamer points to how culture and language influence our way of perceiving 
and interpreting the world.  Our understanding of ourselves and the world is thus a participation in an 
ongoing conversation, where ‘the conversation that we are’ brings us into contact with realities of the 
past and the present. 
In questioning the neutral descriptions of the human sciences, Gadamer reveals a different 
framework of understanding that is premised on dialogical engagement rather than epistemological 
detachment.  Our linguistic descriptions of the human sciences necessarily have to appeal to basic 
features of our understanding of human life – but our appeal to these basic features can also function as 
the barrier to understanding different ways of life and conceptual schemas.  We all have prejudice in 
this way: prejudice (literally ‘pre-judgement’) forms the prism through which we interpret ourselves, 
our engagement with others and the world (Gadamer, 2004).  Gadamer removes the pejorative 
connotations of prejudice to point out how they constitute our way of being, our conceptual schemas, 
and language, forming an unavoidable starting point which grounds our initial interpretive 
understanding.   
Dialogical engagement at two levels is required to further shift our prejudices, enrich our 
understanding, and come to a non-distorted grasp of others or phenomena: first the presence of our 
prejudices and conceptual schemas that orient our intellectual outlooks need acknowledgment, so that 
we can more readily identify where it is difficult to understand the practices or conceptual schemas of 
another.  Second, encounters with ‘alterity’ or otherness function as a necessary trigger for conceptual 
enrichment and ethical growth – they bring to the forefront the contingency of that which we assume 
as true in our prejudices and conceptual schemas.  Coming face-to-face with such difference heightens 
our awareness of the barriers and various distortive views that inhibit genuine understanding of another 
perspective.  Our conceptual schemas necessarily develop and move when we start to question these 
barriers as a result of engaging in dialogue with what seems alien to us.  Gadamer describes this process 
as a ‘fusion of horizons’ – where our respective horizons become expanded and more comprehensive 
through acknowledging the potential truth of other forms of human life (Gadamer, 2004).  Through this 
dialogical process our construal of others is enriched in ways that it becomes truer and less distortive – 
combining different ways of interpreting the world and what matters to human beings.  In other words, 
such dialogical engagement generates a change in one’s own views so that it now includes the 
possibilities imminent to what was initially alien.   
This approach to dialogue clearly distinguishes a hermeneutical framework from that of 
relativism.  The latter suggests that the same proposition might have different truth value and implies 
respect for difference logically follows.  Yet a hermeneutical approach is not committed to such a 
misguided claim, nor would suggest that this could properly ground genuine respect for different ways 
of life.  The end game of ‘fusing horizons’ couldn’t be more different.  We acknowledge different 
vantage points, different questions that we might ask, different features that stand out based on our 
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respective orientations towards the same phenomena, but ultimately, engaging with such difference is 
for the purpose of developing an account that is richer, more comprehensive, or mutually 
comprehensible from a broad range of views or horizons (Taylor, 2002).  Thus, Gadamer still holds fast 
to the idea that different accounts and descriptions can be evaluated against one another – some will 
incorporate less or more distortion, some will be less or more comprehensive, some will have more 
depth and others more superficial.  Learning and understanding are essentially works of mediation 
where new situations are interpretively integrated – even by rejection — into our existing perceptions 
to ‘broaden our horizons’.   
The process of developing undistorted understandings is not easy, however: the transformative 
potential of dialogue contains its own explanation as to why such dialogue can be so difficult to engage 
with in the first place or is often engaged with only superficially.  As discussed in the next section, we 
need to be alive to the difficulties inherent to achieving such dialogue in certain contexts.   
 
Performance of identity and power dynamics between spheres of healing 
 
The reality is that genuine dialogue towards a fusion of horizons is highly demanding.  
Gadamerian hermeneutics is frequently criticised for its overoptimistic depiction of dialogue, where it 
purportedly misjudges the extent to which we are willing to undertake the demanding task of 
relinquishing our misleading views of others (Habermas, 1990).  Even as Gadamer might be guilty of 
this charge to some degree, this framework nonetheless sheds important light on the barriers to cross-
cultural dialogue – namely our reluctance to face the identity cost incurred through transformative 
engagement with alternative conceptual schemas and practices.  As Taylor writes, ‘Really taking in the 
other will involve an identity shift in us.  That is why it is so often resisted and rejected.  We have a 
deep identity investment in the distorted images we cherish of others’ (Taylor, 2002, p. 141).  Even if 
this painful shift is viewed subsequently as improved and ultimately richer, it still means others may be 
unwilling to undertake the initial identity cost that comes with genuinely understanding different 
standpoints.   
The deep tensions inherent to mental health practitioners’ cultural experiences and perceived 
identity, particularly within a competitive healing market, illustrate well the identity cost in, and the 
social barriers to, engaging in the type of transformative dialogue that fosters a ‘fusion of horizons’.  
The motivational barriers to engaging in dialogue are important to acknowledge because they reveal 
the reality that the identity costs of genuine dialogue are not necessarily distributed evenly or fairly.  
How practitioners express their distinctive healing identities is grounded on complex motives related to 
the need to assert one’s influence and unique services within a competitive health market, suggesting a 
potential subjective incentive to emphasise, even exaggerate difference and incommensurability.  This 
reveals that it is not necessarily the case that these different approaches to mental health are 
incommensurable or necessarily commit us to a relativist position, but rather that there are complex 
 11 
reasons to at least let it appear as though constructive dialogue remains impossible, not least to protect 
and regulate the boundaries of one’s healing identity.   
Numerous studies have shown how mental health care (and health care more generally) 
operates in a complex, sometimes overcrowded market, where practitioners from different traditions of 
healing compete to varying degrees to provide services to the public (Kpobi & Swartz, 2018a; Read, 
2017).  In relation to mental health care, non-medical practitioners can feel the need to distance their 
own practices from those of biomedicine by making claims that their approaches are more in tune with 
local understandings and spiritual experiences (Asamoah et al., 2014; Kpobi & Swartz, 2018b; Kpobi, 
Swartz & Omenyo, 2019).  Claims of cultural efficacy seem to constitute a performance of identity 
within a competitive health care domain but could also be reflective of experiences of the limits of 
biomedical psychiatric care (Read, 2009).  By contrast, biomedical practitioners in the mental health 
field who may, like many people globally, simultaneously hold a range of apparently contradictory 
beliefs about mental disorder, its origin and treatments (Swartz, 2008), can sometimes feel the need to 
distance themselves as professionals from views which could be interpreted as animistic or unscientific.  
Consequently, inadvertent tensions between the practitioners’ cultural experiences and perceived 
identity, and their biomedical training can emerge, particularly for professionals who come from 
formerly colonised societies, where the wish to be seen as cosmopolitan and sophisticated forms part 
of a response to racist colonial histories in which local beliefs were viewed  as primitive and dangerous.  
These tensions are experienced not only by practitioners but also by academics and researchers who 
take on the role of presenting and representing the ‘other’ to an academic market in the Global North, 
while at the same time presenting themselves as able to traverse boundaries in a thoughtful and 
sophisticated manner (Swartz, 2018; Swartz & Marchetti-Mercer, 2018). 
Within the non-biomedical healing sector, some practitioners may wish to denigrate the views 
of others in order to accentuate the extent to which they offer distinctively indigenous or appropriate 
services.  In a competitive healing economy, successful business is typically dependent on different 
levels of identification of practitioners with target users.  Moreover, indigenous and faith healing 
practices include elements of everyday experiences and occurrences.  Non-biomedical healers can be 
seen as possessing (and indeed emphasising) culturally familiar identities which afford them some level 
of influence in their communities.  This is not to suggest that non-biomedical practitioners work purely 
for profit, as various studies have shown the commitment to care that many non-medical healers possess 
(Abbo, 2011; Akol et al., 2018; Musyimi et al., 2018).  However, in a context where indigenous and 
faith practices are construed in dominant thought as primitive, practitioners sometimes find it necessary 
to highlight the distinctive benefits of their methods over others.  Paradoxically, across all sectors 
(biomedical, indigenous, and faith-based) there may in fact be greater overlap in beliefs and values than 
may at first appear.  For example, some people express great faith in biomedicine but also set store by 
Christian prayer as a means of healing, and some people who identify as indigenous healers can also 
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identify as Christians, as many of the herbalists interviewed by Kpobi, Swartz and Omenyo (2019), for 
example, revealed. 
The empirical data thus show the complex intersections of identities and motivations that erect 
the practical and motivational barriers to engaging in dialogue amongst mental care practitioners.  These 
practical challenges, however, do not invalidate the goal of trying to achieve an enriched understanding 
of different languages and cultures as a normative ideal.  But what it does reveal is the need for a 
potential conceptual framework which can help foster cross-cultural dialogue and the building of a 
common healing community in the context of diversity, as we discuss in the next section. 
 
Recovery as Discovery 
 
The concept of recovery is a potentially fruitful basis for constructive dialogue and cross-
cultural enrichment in divergent conceptualisations of mental health, but it requires some critical 
distance from overly reductive notions of individual recovery.  Discourses of recovery have 
understandably focused on the patient, moving away from a narrow emphasis on clinical outcomes (i.e. 
observable, measurable outcomes related to symptom remission and a return to previous functioning) 
to person-centred health and individual wellbeing related to establishing a meaningful, satisfying life 
within the experience of disability and illness (Davidson et al., 2005a; Slade et al., 2012; Anthony, 
1993).  However, the current patient-centred paradigm with its emphasis on empowering the person as 
an active partner rather than passive recipient of care, involved in treatment planning, decision-making, 
and leading a productive life (Mezzich et al., 2016) imports neoliberal traits of individualism, self-
control, rationality, and subjective choice (Adenponle, et al, 2012).  This conceptual lens towards the 
patient as the subject and owner of recovery broadly presupposes a neoliberal vision of the person which 
tends to assume its putative universality, disregarding its own cultural genealogy. 
Though resonant with Western biopsychosocial psychological approaches3  this liberal self 
does not necessarily carry across different cultures easily (Adeponle, et al, 2012; Aldersey, 2017).  As 
frequently noted, many African cultures are committed to a more communitarian self, where the 
descriptive and normative dimensions of personhood are closely interlinked with one’s social 
belonging.4  The communitarianism of African personhood does not rest on a trivial claim (i.e. one lives 
and functions within community) but rather presupposes a deeper relational ontology at three levels: (i) 
intrapersonal (that which connects the person to one’s physical and environmental self); (ii) 
interpersonal (that which connects the person to social and familial relations); and (iii) transpersonal 
(that which connects the person to spiritual and ancestral entities) (Kpanake, 2018, Gyekye, 1995; 
Wiredu, 1996; Metz, 2018).   Personhood as embodied in the interconnected agency of physical, social, 
and spiritual essences means that the treatment and healing from mental disorder will depend on this 
holistic framework.  Like other cultural contexts5 the communitarianism of African personhood could 
therefore be seen to run counter to the individualism implied in the recovery movement, where 
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discourses and disagreement around recovery could inadvertently replicate the conceptual polarisation 
we have argued against throughout this paper.  The imperative of dialogical engagement is not 
necessarily embedded in overly individualist accounts of recovery, whilst the etymology of the term 
‘recovery’ seemingly fosters misleading connotations of regaining certain functionalities or a return to 
some kind of subjective equilibrium, giving the concept a backward-looking inflection (Davidson et al, 
2005b). 
Tensions between African and Western notions of personhood must not be overexaggerated, 
though they do indeed point to some disagreement around the locus of and type of agency that is entailed 
in recovery.  What they do indicate is the need for some conceptual refinement to the recovery 
framework: the integration of discovery can help capture how horizons of healing are hermeneutically 
expanded at a subjective, intersubjective, and conceptual level.  What we call recovery as discovery 
expresses the open-ended, forward-inflection that is required to understand multiple dimensions of 
illness and healing experiences through intersubjective dialogue.  As such, this refinement of the 
recovery concept expresses explicitly how healing points to finding new equilibriums in our perceptions 
of health.  The dialectical process of discovery is dynamic and conceptual tensions generate growth that 
resembles an upward-moving spiral rather than linear process, such that the new equilibrium is not a 
return or re-covery to a defined place but a new state, albeit vaguely resonant of previous states.   
Recovery as discovery thus supports and critically refines the recovery framework, making it 
constructive at two levels, at the ‘micro’ level, this concept focuses on the very real, practical 
negotiation of the interpretive meanings of social connection, spiritual belonging, and personhood to 
foster healing at the individual level, and which can model the type of interpersonal engagement that is 
needed across different healing strands.  At a ‘macro’ level, the concept tracks the more abstract cross-
disciplinary, cross-cultural intellectual dialogue that must occur to overcome false dichotomies in the 
global mental health debate, in order to foster genuine conceptual reciprocity between Western and 
African frameworks of healing. 
At the micro-level, recovery as discovery does not foreclose the possible harmony that is both 
interior to the self and exterior with regards to how others relate to the self.  Different cultural contexts 
place varying emphasis on what this harmony might entail, but probing deeper one finds a common 
strand emphasising the importance of family, restoring social connectedness, and normative questions 
about how to live a flourishing life (Adeponle, et al, 2012; Aldersey, 2017).  Much like the variable 
terms which cluster around symptoms broadly defined as ‘depression’, recovery across different strands 
of African healing congregates around the process of establishing links at a horizontal level (with 
family, social relations), at a vertical level (with one’s spiritual beliefs and identity), and the 
containment of adverse forces and disruption to harmony (Kpaneke 2018), thus making the journey 
towards health and well-being a physiological, psychological, social, and spiritual enterprise.  In these 
contexts, the individual’s self perception is tied to a series of relations that are visible — community, 
ethnicity, the earth, religious affiliation— and invisible — the world of the transcendent being, spirits, 
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ancestors.  The notion of well-being is grounded on the harmonious dovetailing of these relations.  This 
suggests that recovery within the person’s environment may include adjustments in attitudes and 
practices that allow persons who do not fit into the dominant model to live and to thrive, encouraging a 
wider approach towards healing that considers both the individual and her surrounding context as the 
subject of healing.  It accommodates the possibility of persons undergoing psychiatric care recurring to 
other health care streams which provide the type of moral or spiritual assistance they feel is absent in 
mainstream psychiatry (Ae-Ngibise, 2010).  
The concept of recovery as discovery thus captures possibilities where dialogical engagement 
could be found and achieved across healing cultures, particularly in how individuals subjectively and 
intersubjectively negotiate their healing in a nexus of complex relations through comparative evaluation 
and mutual respect across mental health perspectives.  For example, Kpanake (2018) explores a case 
study in Togo where a patient navigates the seemingly incommensurable tensions between the beliefs 
of traditional healing and his Christian faith.  Rather than treat these as dichotomous modes of recovery, 
the patient sought a compromise, involving a family member in the traditional healing ceremony whilst 
he followed rituals in accordance with his spiritual identity.  Likewise, Adeponle et al (2017) use the 
example of an individual whose combination of traditional rites, ceremonies, and psychiatric treatment 
led to recovery – not just in terms of the reduction of psychotic symtoms, but ‘on both the horizontal 
plane of family and communal relations and the vertical plane of relations with ancestors’ (p. 121).  
Thus, patients at the crux of different healing processes often model the necessary conceptual and 
dialogical enrichment that comes through negotiating different facets of the interconnected self.  As a 
model, it is particularly instructive for health practitioners of whatever stripe in terms of how dialogue 
could be negotiated in ways that, on one hand, acknowledge the depth of one’s commitments, yet on 
the other, aspire towards a fusion of horizons with seemingly divergent discourses around mental health.  
Notably, in Kpanake (2018) the clinical team explicitly acknowledged and accepted the patient’s mutual 
investment in recovery as defined by the traditional healer and other congregation members of his 
Catholic Church  (2018, pp. 210-11).   This is not to disregard the reality of the motivational barriers 
and identity costs which can aggravate polarisation amongst practitioners of different health care 
strands.  But those factors should not orient discussion of the normative aims and practices of healing 
and mental health which can foster some commonality and enhance humane treatments that address the 
person in a holistic fashion.   
At the ‘macro’ level, recovery as discovery describes the intellectual orientation and dialogue 
that is needed to deepen current theorisations and concepts of mental health and well-being.    Above 
we cautioned against the intellectual dogmatism that is implicit in relativist and universalist positions 
in the global mental health debate.  The dynamism underlying recovery as discovery demands an 
intellectual orientation that is open to dialogical engagement around the possibilities imminent within 
various conceptual schemas around mental health, aspiring towards a Gadamerian ‘fusion of horizons’.  
Such a dialogue would not only stop at the level of persons and their individual mental health, but would 
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be extended to questions of how surrounding mental health approaches emerge historically, 
contextually, and culturally – thereby enriching common descriptive and normative language around 
such practices. The temptation to treat the human rights approach in Western psychiatry ahistorically 
ignores how more humane practices is a product of historical circumstance and the ever-developing 
negotiation of cultural and intellectual traditions.  As such, assumptions about the inability of traditional 
and spiritual healing practices in Africa to undertake and engage in a similar dynamic process, to 
advance more humane treatment of persons with mental disorders, are unwarrated.6  In other words, the 
macro-level global mental health dialogue we are proposing here is an open context of discovery where 
new ideas and perspectives are discovered and the context of justification involves a plurality of 
interpretive models.  This demands acknowledging the prejudices that guide one’s intellectual 
orientation – whether these be disciplinary or socio-cultural – and ‘testing’ them through engaging with 
frameworks that seem other to one’s own.   
For example, the increasing biogenetic orientation in mental health is a pre-judgement that 
forecloses a connection to spiritual forms of transcendence as part of healing the person.  Drawing on 
Philip Rieff’s cultural analysis of the therapeutic turn, Taylor in A Secular Age discusses how the 
transcendent has become off-limits through the therapeutic lens of modern Western secularism, 
whereby the symptoms of mental illnesses, like depression – melancholy, emptiness, etc. – are 
conceived as immanent pathologies of the individual rather than what were formally perceived as signs 
of spiritual misdirection (2007).  He writes, ‘a crucial feature of a purely immanentist therapy is that 
the cure of these incapacities is held to involve – or even demand – our repudiation of, or at least 
distancing from, an aspiration to the transcendent, like religious faith’ (Taylor, 2007, p. 622).  But so 
long as this intellectual ‘distancing’ or ‘repudiation’ occurs, the important role of spiritual 
transcendence and the meaning it brings for many living with mental disorder will be disregarded, even 
within the secular West (Luhrman, 2013; Koenig, 2009).7  It is through undertaking the challenge of 
crossing disciplinary boundaries, of engaging with intellectual frameworks that focus on the deeper 
history, meanings, significance of spiritual therapies, both in the African and Western contexts, that the 
academic lens is better able to understand the transcendent aspirations of patients and human beings 
more generally.  Attending to the spiritual ambitions of patients in their quest to discover a harmonious 
condition of being is therefore a useful resource, not just in the micro-sense discussed above.  Indeed, 
at the macro-level, recovery as discovery promotes academic, cross-disciplinary dialogue which fosters 
an awareness of the historical genealogy and genuine reciprocity in considering ways that African 
conceptual schemas around personhood, social connectedness, and physical and spiritual belonging 





Too often the reality of culturally diverse practices and beliefs towards mental health is thought 
to imply the need to abandon attempts to foster a common purpose and a sense of global community 
for fear of perpetuating colonial discourse, and retreat instead to the intellectual confines of relativism.  
But as we have shown, relativism represents a false comfort: its problematic epistemological 
assumptions and normative implications perpetuate barriers rather than enhance deeper understanding 
of the conceptual schemas, practices, and complex motivations of African populations.   
This paper has explored the type of interpretive orientation that could foster dialogical 
engagement with seemingly incomparable conceptual schemas in global mental health, whilst not 
ignoring the very real identity costs involved in such dialogue.  The moral import of the hermeneutics 
of recovery as discovery is in its cultivation of genuine reciprocity and humility towards African 
conceptual schemas, including appeals to spiritual forms of transcendence.   The ‘Global’ in global 
mental health, if taken seriously, requires a framework which assumes that there is a ‘global’ 
community: in the very etymology of community (communitas), cum munere underlines witness (cum) 
and reciprocity of giving and receiving (munere), whereas the contrary – ‘im-mune’ – denotes isolation 
and non-exchange.  Implicit in any coherent global mental health agenda therefore should be the idea 
of the pursuit of togetherness that is not monolithic but a communion of diversities, where we make 
space for the question of: ‘What can African thought and practice teach us?’.  As Appiah rightly 
describes, why ‘cosmopolitans don’t insist that everyone become cosmopolitan’ is because ‘[t]hey 
know they don’t have all the answers. They’re humble enough to think that they might learn from 
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